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The United States economy dwarfs that of even its closest competitors. Its 2003 gross domestic product (GDP) was $11 trillion compared to Japan’s $4.3 trillion, Germany’s $2.4 trillion and the United Kingdom’s $1.8 trillion. The US economy is the same size as that of all members of the European community combined, and is responsible for a nearly a third of the gross world product of $36 trillion. In addition to its size, the US economy is also remarkable for its continued high levels of growth at a time when the economies of most of its key competitors and trading partners have fallen on hard times. Despite a recession in 2001, it grew by 10 percent between 2000 and 2004, twice the average of the Eurozone countries and considerably better than Germany and Japan, which grew by just 2.4 and 4 percent respectively over the same period. It has by far the largest services output of any nation, and yet it is also the world’s largest industrial producer and second largest agricultural producer. It leads the world in information technology, in communications systems, and new start-ups. It drives the world economy, and it will continue to do so for some time. The old adage that ‘when the United States sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold’ remains true today. One key reason for this is that the US imports about $1.5 trillion of goods and services each year. If the US slides into recession, demand for imports declines, thus tipping its trading partners’ economies into recession too. 

While it is impossible to quantify precisely the reasons for America’s economic strength, many economists point to a combination of factors revolving around its culture of hard work, large-scale immigration, abundant natural resources and high efficiency and productivity. A further explanation is that it has a business-friendly political system that pursues a low-tax regime and does not interfere with market mechanisms. As Ronald Reagan argued, the business of government is not the government of business. Despite periodic howls of protest from Americans that they are overtaxed, the federal government takes only 16 or so percent of GDP in tax, and the state governments another 10 percent, while most European governments take double this. America’s low-tax regime is in part a consequence of its enterprise culture and laissez-faireism, but it also means in turn that government is much less involved in the life of its citizens and corporations in a whole host of ways. Americans do not enjoy the same level of protection as Europeans from William Beveridge’s ‘Giant Evils’ of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. Health care, for example, is fully privatised. Even Clinton’s ambitious but ultimately failed 1994 reforms offered a market-based solution. The government does buy some basic medical services in the private marketplace on behalf of the very poorest and elderly (Medicaid and Medicare), but the vast majority of Americans are left to fend for themselves. Indeed, such is the high cost of medical care that an estimated 45 million Americans have no medical insurance and millions more are underinsured. Moreover, able-bodied unemployed persons cannot look to government for benefits and sustenance. The homeless cannot look to government to provide shelter. And the mentally ill cannot look to government for treatment and protection. While this may seem like wanton cruelty to some European observers, it is the flip side of America’s culture of rugged individualism, freedom and capitalism. Indeed, the absence of a well-woven safety net reinforces the entrepreneurial spirit that drives the American economy forwards and upwards. 

The economy provides the foundation for America’s military and political dominance. A much quoted but instructive statistic is that the US spends as much each year on its armed forces as the next ten biggest spending nations combined. While it does not have the biggest army in the world in terms of manpower (China does), it has the most sophisticated and effective military, which can fight two major wars simultaneously. The invasion of Iraq and its aftermath had cost the US about two hundred billion dollars by the end of 2005—a cost no other nation cold bear without disastrous economic consequences. As well as underpinning America’s ‘hard’ power, its wealth is key to its ‘soft’ power, too. The United States is, for example, the biggest donor to the United Nations and thus its most important member. It is also one of its most reluctant members, with conservative and neo-conservative Republicans in Congress and the White House expressing open hostility. Bush’s warning that the UN must become more ‘relevant’ in the post 9-11 world is code for more supportive of US positions. The United States also uses soft power to influence outcomes in forums such as the WTO, World Bank and IMF. The United States’ delegations to WTO negotiations on free trade include hundreds of specialist lawyers, while many poor nations have no or little legal representation. It is little wonder that the terms and conditions of free trade agreements often favour already wealthy nations and in particular the United States. Developing nations complain that they are forced to open up their markets to American goods, only to find their domestic producers undercut by cheap American imports. This situation is particularly iniquitous when the keen price of the import is itself partly a product of government subsidy. American farmers in particular receive considerable help from the government in the form of subsidies, price supports and tax breaks—advantages not enjoyed by their competitors in less developed countries. Individual American corporations also have considerable power—both outside and within the United States. Wal-Mart’s turnover of $258 billion in 2005 makes it the world’s largest retailer, and the world’s twenty-first largest economy. It has 1.6 million employees and 138 million customers per week visiting over 6,000 stores. 


The US Economy Today 

The economic story of the Bush presidency is complex and mixed. The economy under President Bill Clinton performed spectacularly well during the latter part of the 1990s. Growth was high, tax revenues up, and the budget balanced for the first time in 30 years. However, the economy began to slide between the November 2000 presidential election and Bush’s inauguration in January 2001 and by mid 2001 was firmly in the grip of recession. Growth in GDP fell from nearly 2 percent in the first quarter of 2001 to just 0.8 percent in the last quarter (OECD, May 2005). When inflation is taken into account, the economy actually contracted during 2001. Other economic indicators tell a similar story. While unemployment fell steadily between 1995 and 2000 from nearly 6 to 4 percent, these gains were lost during 2001. Unemployment increased again in 2002 before reaching a peak in mid 2003 (see figure 1). Share prices also suffered. The great American bull market saw the Dow Jones Industrial Average rise exponentially from under 1,300 in 1983 to its all-time high of 11,723 in January 2000. By the end of the year, however, the DJIA dropped back 8 percent, fell 7 percent in 2001 and a further 17 percent in 2002 (see figure 2). While nearly all stocks suffered, a good proportion of the decline was due to the bursting of the dot.com bubble. NASDAQ, the stock index which includes many IT stocks, rose sharply in the late 1990s as corporate and private investors piled money into established companies like Microsoft and new start-ups—many of which had never made a profit and some of which had no product to sell. In March 2000 the NASDAQ index peaked at 5,000 but tumbled to 3,200 in mid 2000 and 1,600 in early 2001. By late 2002 the index stood at 1,100, the same level as in 1996 when nobody had heard of dot-coms and high-tech bubbles (see figure 3). 

[figures 1, 2 and 3 about here]

The largest technology failure was the established communications corporation WorldCom, which had merged with MCI, another communications specialist, in 1997 in a huge $37 billion deal. In June 2002 an internal audit revealed that $3.8 billion had been ‘miscounted’, a total later raised to $11 billion. The corporation had been inflating its profits and assets in order to increase its share price. In July 2002 WorldCom filed for bankruptcy in the biggest corporate collapse in US history and three years later its founder Bernie Ebbers and many top executives were found guilty of fraud. The 63-year-old Ebbers was sentenced in July 2005 to 25 years in prison. WorldCom’s demise was trigged by the collapse of Enron. Based in Houston, Texas, and led by the charismatic Kenneth Lay, a personal friend of and financial contributor to George W. Bush (who used to refer to him as Kenny Boy), Enron was the darling of the corporate world due to its fast growth, high stock prices and large dividends. Fortune magazine labelled it ‘America’s Most Innovative Company’ five times in the mid-to-late 1990s, but the edifice crumbled in 2001. It was alleged that Enron and bribed and misused political connections to win contracts; that it in part caused California’s energy blackouts by reducing supply to increase prices and thus its own profits; and that it used creative and fraudulent accounting to inflate its profits and share price. As the scandal unfolded, with its share price collapsing from $85 to just thirty cents, Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001 in the then biggest corporate collapse in US history. It triggered a wave of further scandals and bankruptcies, and for a short time the foundations of corporate America looked to have been built on sand. Congress reacted quickly by passing the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act in July 2002 (commonly referred to as Sox after its congressional sponsors Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael G. Oxley). The law increased protection for stockholders by updating corporate accounting procedures to ensure transparency and accuracy. The unusual speed with which Congress reacted to the scandals and the law’s thoughtful changes did much to help stabilise the situation.  

While the stock market and corporate America have experienced many ups and downs in recent years, inflation has remained steady and low. In the 1970s and early 1980s, inflation was regularly at or above 10 percent, but has been below 4 percent for the last two decades. The success in defeating inflation is largely attributed to the Federal Reserve Board, the United State’s truly independent central bank, established by the Owen-Glass Act of 1913. While the Bank of England is often described today as independent after Gordon Brown freed it from government control in 1997, in truth the bank only enjoys ‘operational independence’. This means that Gordon Brown sets the inflation target (say 2.5%) and the bank’s monetary policy committee sets interest rates to the meet the target. In contrast, the Federal Reserve has free reign over monetary policy; it sets inflation targets and interest rates. Increasing interest rates tightens the money supply and should dampen inflationary pressures; conversely, reducing rates expands the supply and should encourage economic growth. The problem is that low interest rates engender inflation as well as growth, while high rates constrain both. The Board’s tricky job is to strike a delicate balance between keeping inflation under control and allowing the economy to expand. 

The underlying inflation rate was 3 percent in 1995. It declined to 2 percent between 1995 and 1999, rose three-quarters of point during the 2000 and 2001 and dropped back one-and-half points to only 1 percent in late 2003, before rising again during 2004. While the Board has done a good job over the last quarter century of reducing inflation without tipping the economy over into a serious recession, economic commentators often single out one person in particular as responsible for this success: Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Often referred to as the ‘maestro’, he was appointed chair in 1987 by Ronald Reagan and reappointed by Presidents George Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. His tenure as America’s and therefore the world’s chief monetary policy maker is widely regarded a great success, but his vast experience, steady hand and impressive record make him a difficult act to follow after his retirement on 31 January 2006. His successor, Ben Bernanke, previously a Federal Reserve governor and chair of Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors, is an academic economist rather than a Wall Street practitioner. While news of his appointment was warmly received by the financial markets and easily confirmed by the Senate, it remains to be seen whether his tenure will be judged as successful as Greenspan’s.  

The Board’s tricky job of using interest rates to balance inflation and growth is made more problematic still because rates also impact on the trade deficit and exchange rates. High interest rates, for example, help push up the price of the dollar (more people buy dollars as the return increases), thus making American exports more expensive and imports cheaper. This in turn has both positive and negative effects. Cheaper imports help dampen inflation but expensive exports make it more difficult for US firms to sell goods abroad, possibly leading to economic contraction at home and a trade deficit as imports grow relative to exports. Indeed, the United States’ trade deficit—defined simply as the difference between what America sells to and buys from foreign nations— has increased markedly in recent years. The United States now imports half as much again as it exports, with the current deficit at about $700 billion per year and rising. The conundrum is that the deficit has worsened at the same time as the dollar has fallen in value by roughly a third against a basket of major currencies. Some economists explain the puzzle by pointing out that the benefits of a weak dollar and low export prices have been outweighed by a drop in demand in key American markets in Asia and Europe. Unsurprisingly, the trade deficit and international trade is a hot political issue in the US today, and we will return to this below. 





The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the ‘power of the purse’. Specifically, it is given power to set and collect taxes, to borrow money, to print money, and to regulate commerce between the US and foreign nations and between the individual states. However, Congress has delegated much of its authority in matters of the purse to other actors. As we saw above, it gave control of monetary policy to the Federal Reserve in 1913. The ‘Fed’ as it is known sets its own inflation and money supply targets and moves interest rates up or down to meet these targets without congressional or presidential approval. Under the provisions of the 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins Act, the Fed’s chair must from time to time testify before Congress on monetary policy and the general state of the American economy, but Mr Greenspan was always treated with great reverence and afforded great respect and little effort was made to influence him. Congress does though have the authority to change the role and power of the Federal Reserve. It created the bank and gave it control over interest rates, and it could legislate once more to curtail its powers or even abolish it. This is however little more than a theoretical power. The bank’s independence survived the Great Depression of the inter-war years and the economic difficulties of the 1970s, and it is difficult to see what circumstances could lead Congress to attempt such an audacious power grab, and even more difficult to image that it would succeed. 

As well as delegating control of monetary policy to an independent central bank, Congress delegated some, but by no means all, control over fiscal policy to the executive branch with the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act in 1921. Fiscal policy refers to issues surrounding taxation and government expenditure, and the president must under the terms of the 1921 act submit to Congress an annual budget. To advise the president on budgetary measures, the act established a Bureau of the Budget, later named the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The budget is key to the governmental process because it sets the parameters for all federal spending on health, education, defence, pensions and so on. The Employment Act, passed by Congress in 1946, set the goal of full employment and gave the president further powers to manage the economy to meet the new goal. The act also established the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) to advise the president on the best ways to achieve his goals. Further advice and information is provided by the Treasury and independent experts in academia and think-tanks. Some presidents establish further layers of bureaucracy to coordinate, order and filter the mass of data, interpretations and policy options. Clinton, for example, set up and chaired the National Economic Council, a large, unwieldy advisory body designed to bring together the many economic policymakers in his administration, whereas George W. Bush relies on informal discussions with a few trusted aides. However individual presidents organise their staff, they all need good advice to achieve their policy and persuasive goals (Neustadt 1990), and the OMB, CEA, Treasury and more informal channels give the president an important institutional advantage over Congress in making fiscal policy. While individual members of Congress may receive advice from independent experts and congressional committees can call experts and bureaucrats to testify before it, for many years Congress the institution had no formal bureaucracy to advise on fiscal policy. The situation came to a head in the early 1970s when President Richard Nixon refused to spend money specifically appropriated by Congress to certain projects. In response, Congress passed the Budget and Impoundment Control Act in 1974 to prevent presidents ‘impounding’ funds. The act also attempted to redress the executive branch’s institutional advantage by establishing the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a non-partisan public-sector think-tank. It produces a ‘Budget and Economic Outlook’ report in January, which serves as Congress’s starting point for budget deliberation, an independent estimate of the President’s budget each February, and economic forecasts and expenditure and revenue projections throughout the year. 





With the economy booming and the budget in surplus, Bush argued during the 2000 presidential election campaign that middle-class Americans should share in the country’s economic good fortune in the form of an unprecedented $1.3 trillion tax cut. Al Gore also promised to cut taxes, but ‘only’ by a third as much as Bush. Gore proposed instead to spend the rest of the surplus on paying off some of the national debt and increasing spending on public services. It is difficult to argue that Bush’s policy plans were the crucial difference between the candidates—in part because Gore actually won more popular votes than Bush and in part because the economy was for once not a key election issue. It looked as if economic good times had returned, whoever won the election. Such optimism was soon dashed, however. The economy began to slide into recession in late 2000, and the president-elect’s huge tax cut appeared doomed. In what some commentators regard as a deft political move and others as astonishing effrontery, Bush stopped arguing that a tax cut was necessary to give over-taxed Americans their money back and started arguing, using the language of Keynes, that a tax cut was necessary to stimulate demand and get the economy back on its feet again. Critics pilloried Bush for his ‘one solution fits all problems’ approach, argued that people saved not spent tax rebates during difficult economic times, and pointed out that the vast majority of the tax cut would go not to ordinary Americans but to the very wealthiest. Despite the opposition of many professional economists, Bush succeeded in steering his tax cut through difficult congressional waters—a political victory that should not be underestimated. While presidential scholars tell us that it is increasingly difficult for presidents to get their policy proposals through congress (Rose 1991), Bush did so only 7 months after receiving fewer popular votes than Al Gore, only 6 months after the Republican-dominated Supreme Court awarded him Florida’s electoral college votes and thus the presidency, and with a Senate split 50-50 along party lines. Bush’s much underestimated persuasive talents are the key to his success in this and other policy areas. His new defence of the tax cut as a stimulus package appealed to the few centrist Democrats in the Senate whose votes would be necessary to pass the budget resolution and head off a later filibuster on the tax bill proper. 

Bush’s advisors claim that “substantial tax relief together with expansionary monetary policy provided stimulus to aggregate demand that softened the recession and helped put the economy on the path to recovery” (CEA, February 2005). It may well be true that “without the boost to disposable income from tax relief, the recession would have been deeper and longer” (CEA, February 2006), but the debate among economists concerns how much deeper and longer and whether alternative measures, such as a $1.3 trillion injection of government spending, would have proved more effective. Moreover, data show that Americans squirreled away much of their tax cut in savings accounts or used it to pay off debt.  As 2001 progressed, the economy dipped further into recession as the dot-com bubble deflated and the 9-11 terrorists attacks dented consumer and producer confidence. The response of the Bush administration was more of the same. Signed into law in May 2003, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act reduced taxes by a further $350 billion, the third largest cut in US history. It sought to stimulate capital investment, private spending and consumption. To do so it allowed firms to claim larger tax deductions for depreciation, reduced capital gains tax and tax on dividends, accelerated the introduction of lower income tax bands, and increased child tax credits. 

Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry tried to turn America’s faltering economy to his advantage early in the 2004 presidential election campaign. In March and April 2004 he criticised Bush’s “failed economic policies that have steadily led America into economic decline… There is not a single month of this administration that has seen the creation of a single manufacturing job” (USA Today, 2 July 2004). However, as the election approached, economic performance improved. While it would not match the formidable expansion of the late 1990s, GDP began to grow more strongly and unemployment declined. According to Gallup, perceptions of current economic conditions improved during 2004, the first time for three years. Perceptions about how the economy would perform in the future also improved after a small fall in 2003. In response, Kerry and his team changed tack, and started arguing that although things were getting better, they were not doing so quickly enough. “Are you really satisfied with the president’s economic performance? Is the improving economy actually lifting all boats? And has President Bush addressed the biggest short-term and long-term economic challenges facing us—health care, energy costs, education and the deficit—the way he should have?” asked Kerry economic advisor Gene Spelling. A Bush spokesperson in turn attacked the Kerry camp for taking “good news about the fastest-growing economy in 20 years and try[ing] to spin it into bad news. His strategy relies on gross misinterpretations of reality and the manipulation of statistics” (USA Today, 2 July 2004). 

The Kerry campaign lost ground in August when an organisation called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth accused Kerry of lying about this Vietnam record. The allegations dominated media coverage and Kerry began to slip in the polls. Kerry shook up his campaign team in response, bringing in some old faces from the Clinton administration. James Carville, Stanley Greenberg, Joe Lockhart and others had helped Clinton win in 1992 and 1996 by focusing on the economy—Carville authored the famous “It’s the economy, stupid!” memo—and thought that Kerry should do the same. Clinton himself spoke to Kerry and urged him to hit Bush harder on economic issues, and especially jobs, in swing states. While Gallup polls showed that Americans were more optimistic in 2004 than 2003, the increases were from a very low base. During 2004 only a net 14 percent felt positive about the country’s current economic performance and a net 5 percent were positive about the future. According to political scientists (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992), incumbent presidents struggle to win elections when voters are worried about future economic prosperity. Worryingly for Bush, only a small minority of Americans felt confident in early 2004 and many actually became less confident during the four months preceding the November presidential election. Indeed, in the final Gallup poll before the election only a net 12 percent were positive about current economic performance and a net 11 percent were negative about future prospects. Given this context, it seems that Clinton and his former advisors were right to try to persuade Kerry to push the economy up the agenda. Kerry certainly thought so, and took their advice, arguing, “if you believe that losing good paying jobs and replacing them with ones that don’t pay the bills means that America is heading in the right direction, you should vote for George Bush and his policies of failure” (The Guardian, 6 September 2004). Kerry also promised to repeal the portion of Bush’s tax cuts for America’s wealthiest two percent.

Despite Gallup’s evidence that many Americans felt uneasy about their own and the country’s prospects, Kerry’s refined strategy to run hard on the economy did not ultimately deliver him the office of the presidency, largely because the economy was not the defining issue of the campaign. In a closed NEP exit poll in which respondents were asked to choose from a predetermined list of seven issues, 20 percent said the economy was the most significant issue, while 22 percent said moral values, 19 percent terrorism and 15 percent Iraq. Kerry won most votes among those who said the economy and Iraq were the key issue, but Bush won comfortably among voters who placed moral values or terrorism top of their list. In an open-ended Pew Research Center poll, only 12 percent identified the economy as the top issue, while 14 percent said moral values, 9 percent terrorism and 25 percent Iraq. In the post-election post-mortems, some commentators and many of Clinton’s advisors argued that Kerry should have made the economy more central to his campaign. Others rejected this view, arguing he should have focused more on the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. Whatever the rights and wrongs of these interpretations, it should be remembered that if just a few hundred thousand voters in Ohio had switched from Bush, Kerry would be President of the United States and his campaign team lauded as political geniuses. Such is the difference between success and failure. 

Bush’s Second Term Challenges

Bush argued in his 2 February 2005 State of the Union Address that his stewardship of the American economy over the previous four years had been a great success: the recession was over, growth strong, taxes cut, corporate criminals prosecuted, home ownership at record levels, and 2.3 million jobs created in 2004 alone. In his vision for the next four years, Bush promised to restrain federal spending and cut the deficit, reform education and training, cut red-tape for entrepreneurs and small businesses, reform “the archaic, incoherent federal tax code” and make permanent his first-term tax cuts. In addition, he proposed fundamental reform of the immigration system to allow immigrant ‘guest workers’ to fill jobs Americans won’t do, and of the social security system (pensions) which “is headed towards bankruptcy.” Bush fleshed out the basic ideas set out in the State of the Union Address a few days latter in his Budget Message of the President that accompanies the OMB-authored Budget of the United States Government and also in the Economic Report of the President accompanying the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors. 

The 2006 budget proposed a 4.8 percent increase in funding for America’s armed forces to guard against security threats at home and abroad, including $35 billion to reorganise the structure of the armed forces, an extra $1.5 billion for the Millennium Challenge Account to promote good economic and governance policies in less developed nations, and $555 million more for the FBI. Bush has increased defence spending by some 40 percent since taking office in 2001, but the extra money promised for the war on terror and other security threats makes it more difficult to achieve his other key objectives of reducing federal spending and cutting taxes. His task is made more problematic still because most federal spending is difficult to cut—it is in the language of budget politics non-discretionary. Moreover, a good chunk of discretionary spending, that which is ripe for cuts, is actually constituted by defence and security expenditure, which Bush increased. In the event, Bush’s budget proposed to increase total discretionary spending by a below-inflation 2.1 percent and reduce non-security discretionary spending by 1 percent. These savings, albeit small, combined with increased tax revenues from a slowly expanding economy should according to Bush’s projections permit a decline in the budget deficit from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2005 to 3.0 percent in 2006 and eventually down to 1.5 percent in 2009. Of course, the US government still spends more than it raises in taxes each year, but the overspend is declining relative to the size of the overall economy. None the less, Bush inherited from Clinton a budget in surplus and a declining national debt. Today the budget is in deficit and the national debt is rising. 

Lower tax rates, according to the OMB, “reduce obstacles to growth by increasing the incentives to work, save, invest, innovate, and start new businesses,” but low taxes on their own are not enough. The American tax code itself “is not just a complicated mess; it is also a maze of special-interest loopholes that cause America’s taxpayers to spend more than six billion hours every year on paperwork. Work, entrepreneurship, investment, ownership, and even education are discouraged by our tax system” (OMB, February 2005). One radical reform advocated by some Republicans and laissez-faire economists is to abolish the federal income tax altogether and replace it with a ‘consumption’ tax—very much like VAT in the UK. Doing so would make the tax system less progressive and more regressive; it would in other words shift the burden of taxation away from richer Americans and towards poorer ones. For this reason, it will likely to be opposed by most congressional Democrats and perhaps some centrist Republicans, and thus unlikely to become law. Bush will probably have more success reforming the tax code to encourage Americans to save more. Historically, ordinary American citizens saved about 10 percent of their income, but since the 1990s the figure has fallen precipitously, dwindling to just 1 percent in 2004. Savings are important because they provide stability during recessions and engender economic growth when loaned by financial institutions to entrepreneurs. To promote a culture of saving and thus promote prosperity, Bush has proposed three new programmes—Retirement Savings Accounts, Employer Retirement Savings Accounts and Individual Development Accounts. 

Bush also hopes to reform the litigation system, which he believes places an unwarranted burden on businesses, often does little for the victim, while lining the pockets of lawyers. For example, according to the Bush administration, asbestos lawsuits have forced 74 companies into bankruptcy, resulted in 50,000 lost jobs, and will cost up to $265 billion. Lawsuits against medical practitioners are also destructive because they force doctors to practice defensive rather than preventative medicine and to take out expensive insurance policies to cover against sometimes-malicious claims, thus increasing the overall cost of healthcare. A key problem for Bush’s reform agenda is that lawyers are a significant force in the corridors of power in Washington. They are well organised, have top lobbyists working on their behalf, and donate large sums of money to both political parties (especially the Democrats). 

Powerful special interests also pose a barrier to Bush’s professed desire to promote free trade in an interdependent and globalised economy. Economists argue that free trade allows countries to specialise in products they produce most efficiently. This pushes down prices and/or increases quality and, when traded freely in the global market, enriches everyone. Bush and his economic advisors argue that free trade is good because it opens up new markets for many American goods, helps push down prices and expands choices for consumers, and encourages foreign investment in the US economy. All this adds up to more and better jobs and a vibrant economy. Whatever aggregate benefits free trade may bring, it unquestionably imposes individual-level costs and thus engenders well-organised opposition. 

Opposition to free trade almost derailed Bush’s proposal to augment the North American Free Trade Agreement (NATFA) between the US, Canada and Mexico with the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) between the US, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. The seven nations signed the pact in May 2004 but Congress only ratified it in July 2005 after vigorous lobbying by Bush and his officials. Pro-labour Democrats thought the agreement did too little to protect workers’ rights and worried about the threat posed to American workers’ jobs and wages by cheap foreign labour and imports; environmentalists feared that the damaging effects of unbridled development; and American farmers and some of their Republican supporters didn’t want government subsidies cut and tariffs abolished. For example, US sugar producers were protected by a quota system that limits the amount of (cheap) foreign sugar imported each year. The quotas pushed up the price of sugar for producers of goods containing sugar, and in turn raised prices for consumers. They also artificially constrained the potential market of more efficient foreign producers. While US sugar producers employ relatively few people nationwide, many producers are located in Florida where they are an important employer and contributor to the state economy. They are also well organised and very influential. Thus, many of Florida’s congressmen and women opposed CAFTA, and politicians with national ambitions must take care to listen carefully to this key presidential election state. While Bush ultimately was able to secure CAFTA’s passage, one observer noted that “the last-minute negotiations for Republican votes resembled the wheeling and dealing on a car lot. Republicans who were opposed or undecided were courted during hurried meetings in Capitol hallways, on the House floor and at the White House. GOP leaders told their rank and file that if they wanted anything, now was the time to ask…. Many of the favors bestowed in exchange for votes will be tucked into the huge energy and highway bill” (Blustein and Allen, Washington Post, 28 July 2005). Bush hopes to follow CAFTA with an ambitious plan to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas, a hemispheric free trade pact among 34 nations in north, central and south America. Negotiations to create the world’s largest free-trade area began in 1994 but are stalled due to the opposition of some countries, notably Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, which recently elected more left-wing leaders opposed to the US version of free-market capitalism. 








Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Main Economic Indicators, May 2005 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005)

Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, 1990)

Richard Rose, The Postmodern President: George Bush Meets the World (New Jersey: Chatham House, 1991)

Congressional Budget Office, Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015 (at www.cbo.gov)

Council of Economic Advisors, Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005)

George W. Bush, Economic Report of the President (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005)

Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2006 (at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/)

MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson and James A. Stimson, ‘Peasants or Bankers: The American Electorate and the US Economy’, American Political Science Review, 1992, Vol. 86, pp. 597-611
























Figure 3: NASDAQ 


Data Source: Nasdaq.com



